This is where the UK’s expeditionary land power should be focussed. In another long-form article, I argue that an enhanced Joint Port Opening Capability would be an invaluable complement to the British Army’s Land Strike concept. In this articleI suggested that Norway has little need for an understrength amphibious light infantry brigade with modest mobility and even more modest artillery support but instead, would certainly welcome an ability to secure some of their airbases from infiltration by enemy special forces, dovetailing with the littoral security focus I suggested above. Incidentally, there would still be a major role for HMS Albion/Bulwark in this vision, more on this when I get round to developing these ideas further in a future article.
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The new organisation would concentrate on existing roles such as maritime and littoral security, SF support, cold-weather training, and small to medium scale raiding but would develop into new areas such as combat search and rescue (personnel recovery)and littoral dominance that would enhance carrier strike and complement investments in emerging unmanned capabilities for shallow water ASW, mine countermeasuresand survey. Divested of much of 3CDO’s British Army Combat Support/Combat Service Support the Royal Marines would still retain their unique ethos and training system. The proposal articulated in the linked article above would result in a smaller Corps of Royal Marines as a result of disbanding 3 Commando Brigade. Many childishly see my view as some sort of anti RM/RN bias, but that could not be further from the truth. I think we need to take a deep breath, stand back and not indulge in unrealistic viewpoints that always see funds appear from somewhere, or what seems to be the general position of many, cut the Army to pay for the Royal Marines. In the debate that followed, and reinforced by recent output from the House of Commons Defence Select Committee, there was/is a tendency to see amphibious capability as a discrete item that lionised and bathed in over-emotional superlatives, but not in any way connected to the funding and manning realities, actual operational challenges or linked to wider operational capabilities like the Army’s emerging Strike Brigade concept.
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Writing about UK Amphibious Capabilities recently I suggested that given the range of challenges (all requiring lots of cash to meet) and lack of investment priority for the amphibious force, the UK should make significant changes to 3 Commando Brigade. The Controversial Bit Where I Talk About Future Structures
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Exploiting its mobility, firepower and low logistics demand, it would have applicability in both conventional and non-conventional conflict.īeyond the general concept, this article will also make a proposal for a change to the UK force structure, especially for the 16 Air Assault Brigade (16AAB), the Light Infantry and Light Cavalry.Įquipment and vehicle options will be described in detail. It is not about deploying inter-theatre by air, but within a theatre over a large area. The Light Strike Brigade is therefore based on the core principles of the joint land strike concept but with much lighter vehicles that can exploit the mobility afforded by UK Support Helicopters. They are based on a collection of ‘medium weight’ tracked and wheeled vehicles, none of which can exploit the mobility advantages of support helicopters because they are too heavy.
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We know that the British Army’s Strike Brigade is built around the concept of disaggregated operations across a large area where forces concentrate at points in time and space to deliver a range of meaningful effects.